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lV!ERKOURIS

C.2d

Criminal Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanitythe
whether a "doubt" has arisen
is for determination of the trial judge
a doubt may be said
as a matter of
of discretion by
be disturbed
[2a,

!d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Discretion.-Where a doubt of defendant's sanity at the time of trial
appears on the face of the record as a matter of law, as where
the
after reading an affidavit of a qualified psychiatrist
in
it was averred that defendant was medically and
legally insane, and after being told that defendant did not
want a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity entered, said
that it would be "compelled" to accept such a plea, an abuse
of discretion in permitting defendant to withdraw the plea is
shown, the failure to order a determination of the question of
sanity results in a miscarriage of justice, and a reversal is
required.
[3] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Necessity For.
-Where three court-appointed psychiatrists considered defendant sane at the time of trial and at the time the crime
in question was committed, and one independent psychiatrist
considered him both legally and medically insane at both times,
such conflict in medical evidence was sufficient to make the
question one of fact which should have been tried.
[4] !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt.-It is
the court's duty to order an inquisition on its own motion if
at any time a doubt arises as to a defendant's present sanity,
and no plea of present insanity is required for a trial of such
issue.
[5] Attorneys-Authority-Control of Litigation.-An attorney of
record has the exclusive right to appear in court for his client
See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 156; Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 85 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Criminal Law, § 236(2); [2]
Criminal Law, § 236(5); [3] Criminal Law, § 236; [5] Attorneys,
§55; [6] Homicide,§ 262; [7] Criminal Law, § 32.5; [8, 9] Homi§ 67; [10] Criminal Law, § 531; [11] Homicide, § 119; [12]
Criminal Law,§ 1080(5); [13] Criminal Law,§ 516; [14] Homicide,
§ 267; [15] Homicide, § 235; [16] Criminal Law, § 582 (1).

was properly instructed
for which such evidence wns received.
Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge.- Tt is llw
the
in the admini::;tration of
to preserve the order
of the court and to see that all pPrsons,
defendant
indulge in no act or conduet ealcnlntrd to obstruct
the administration of justice; and it was not prejudicial misconduct to inl'orm defendant, who had
:weused the
of running the trial in a yery
that
he made anotlwr outburst lw would
[81 Homicide-Evidence-Threats.---While threats made
defendant against the dect'ased are admissible in r·\-[upneP in n
murder prosecntion to show
threats
another
]l('l'c'(ll1 are only :1tlmitted under circumstnnePs which show
some connection with thP in.iur:· inflidet1 011 tlH·
and
where a sufficient cmml'dion is shown sueh threats arc admissible.
Id.-Evidence-Threats.---WherP the evidenee shmn·d that
defendant's former wife and her new husband lwr1 hf'Pll killed
the same manner aud presumably :1t the samP time, r1efend1etter to his fon;H·r wi !'<o which accused her of
a
sexual degenerate could be considered a malicious ldter nnd
he wrote to her 1ww hushnnd, tPlling him not to woJT~·
nbout his wife's allrged sexunl drgencracy hPc:Juse he would
11ot lw around long, could hr (:Oilsidere<1 a thrnnt lwenuse of
to defendant's former wife.
Criminal Law-Evidence--Best and Secondary Evidence.-~
eourt in a murder prosecution did not err in
evidence> of tht' contents of h~ttPrs which tle CelH1:mt
lind St'nt his
of the destruction tlwreof
first madn
who lrrter testified :JS
contents of the lcttPrs.
Homicide-Evidence-Letters.---Remotenf;s:-; in
malicious and threatening letters which
in n

had
of
rather than its
Criminal Law-Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-Defendant
cannot
that a copy of the
recordofficer with him was played
and the
the copy, was
Evidence.-Defendant cnnnot
notrs and a written trannn offieer IYPre erroneousl,v
of a
admitted in evidence
where the Tecord shows
thnt
to Code Civ. Proc., § 2047,
memoTy from
that the
were marked for identificmtion, and that
the court informed all attorneys they might sc>e and use them,
to which defense counsel replied, "Thank you very mueh.''
i14] Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In a
murder prosecution, it was prejudicial error to give an instruction on lying in wait where, though there was evidence that
defendant was the man who had been sitting in an automobile
near decedent's shop for some time prior to the dnte of the
crime, there was no evidence tending to show that defendant
made any attempt to conceal himself or to keep his presence
in the vicinity of the shop a secret, and where the last time
his car was shown to have been parked in the vicinity was
two days before the crime.
[15] !d.-Instructions-Duties of Jurors.-In a murder prosecution, the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction concerning the jury's duty if the evidence was
susceptible of two reasonable theories, one pointing to his
guilt and the other to his innocence, where the evidence was
f'ntirely circumstantial, no murder weapon was ever found,
no fingrrprints matching those of drfPndant were found in the
shop where tlw crime was committed, nnd the most incriminating evidenee
deff'ndnnt, which the jUt')' could have
clisheliew:d, was that he was i(kntified ns the man coming out
of the hack
of the shop.
[16] Criminal Law- Evidence- Degree of Proof- Reasonable
Doubt.-In a criminal case the prosecution must prove defendnnt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the evidence
is equally balanced, defendant is entitled to an acquittal.

APPEATj (antomati(·ally talwn und<~r Pen. Cocl(•, § 1239,
) from a jndg·ment of the Superior Cunrt of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a llCW trial.

snbd.

Charles

Vv.

Friekc, J udgc.

Be versed.

I iL Brown.
i1orJJcy

t1

iet~<·ral,

.J illlli'S
llllirdm· of
Hot gui
, aiHl not

He
'l'he jnry returned a Yerdiet of first
bast~(]
upon eireumDefendant 's motiou for a JlC\r trial was
and judgnwnt was thereafter
and the
imposetl. 'I'he HJlpcal is antomatie. (Pen. Code,
snbd. (b).)
J)pfemlant and Despiue were married in Midi ig·an in 1944.
nwve!l to r,os .Angeles wlH•re they St'parated ill February,
Dt•fetH_hwt rliYorc~ed Dt~svine in l\Iit·lligaa in l\Iay, ] })4;).
was marriet1 to Hobert Forbes in
, 194f),
Angeles. Robert, a formrr police oflieer, and Des pine
\l't·ni. into the eemmies bm:iness at G~J:](j \Vest Boulevard in
the summet· of lD-l-8. lnspeetor \Yood of the United
Post Offiee ret'eiwt1 a telephone ('all fro!\l a lll<lll
id,·ntifie(] himsel1' as Hobert Forbes.
'Wood
that the person iclentifying him;-;elf as Hobert Po1·bes
JlWdl:
eomplaint iuyo]ving a Yiolation of postal regulations
n·st~lt of whieh he went to the eeramies shop and interHobet·t Forbes. B'orbes diredecl Inspector ·wood to
the home of Despine's mother where he pieked up three
in l'u vtlopes. TlH' envelope;,: were postmarLed at Los
and two of them were ad<1ressed to l\Ir. Forbes awl
l\I rs. J;'orbes; the letters -vvere signed ",Jim JYierkonris"
. " The letters acensec1 J\Trs. Porbes of being
degenerate and toltl Mr. F'orbes 1wt to worry abont

Sta1

'J>dendant was charged in another information with
'l'he distrid
to
only on the information charging the murder of
after the ven1id wns rdnmed, reqnest.ed permission to

Hull\crt F'orbes, husband of Despiue.

witlt,[rnw this plen.

of these points :He now
revase tlt<' judgm(·llt nnd will l>e

r·on1t sltonld
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was fined
After the
Wood dematter.
officer testified that Porbes had told him he was
a
to carry a gun because Despine 's
"ex-husband" had been telephoning them and writing letters
and that he was afraid of the man.
defendant and one Jerry Pappos ran a restaurant
Michigan, for about three weeks. During that
Mr. Pappos went to the restaurant one morning and
found a box with two guns in the bottom of the cigarette
case. One of the guns had a cylinder on it similar to that
on a Colt .38, but they were bigger. When he asked defendant about the guns, defendant said they belonged to a
friend of his. Mr. Pappos told the defendant to get rid of
them and defendant said, "Soon I get the guy I get them
out." The guns disappeared shortly thereafter. When the
business was broken up, Mr. Pappos bought defendant's interest by buying defendant a car in his, Pappos', name, and
making the payments thereon. The car was a black 1953
Pontiac hard-top.
The record shows that defendant, using the name "Jerry
Pappas,'' registered at a hotel in Los Angeles on September 3,
1954; that he was driving a black 1953 Pontiac with Michigan
license plates. Defendant checked out of the hotel on September 8, 1954.
Customarily, Robert Porbes took Despine to the ceramics
and then took their daughter to the home of Despine's
mother where she vvas cared for during the day. Almost
eYery day, Robert would park his car on West Pifty-ninth
Place, go down the alley and into the back of the ceramics
shop. On the morning of September 20th, a witness testified
that he saw Robert open a window of the ceramics shop at
about 9 :10 or 9 :15; at from 9 :15 to 9 :20 on the same morning,
Robert took the daughter to Despine's mother's home where
he was given a bowl of mush to take to Despine. Sometime
between 9 and 10, the morning of the 20th, Robert was seen
to park his car on Pifty-ninth Place and go toward the back
of it as if to go down the alley.
Mr. and Mrs. Miner operated a service station at 5924
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man
same car
word
the >vhcel.
from
'' on the license plate. On each of the
7th through the 18th, with the
of Sun, the 12th, the Miners saw the same car, with what apto be the same man, parked either by the
on \Vest Boulevard or on Fifty-ninth Place
headed east toward \Vest Boulevard. rrhe man's head,
when he was parked on Vvest Boulevard, appeared to the
Miners to be facing south on \Vest Boulevard and at times
he
to be looking at the service station. vVhen the
was parked on Fifty-ninth Place west of \Vest Boulevard,
he
to J\frs. Miner to be looking in the direction of
the service station or straight ahead. On September 14, 1951,
Mr. Miner became suspicious and called the car to the attention of a sergeant of the Police Department. The sergeant,
was in sport clothes, off dnty, and a customer of the
drove around behind the suspect car aiH1 aseertained
that the license plate read AA 6:1:10 1\Iiehigan. He ·wrote the
number on the back of an envelope and gaYe it to the Miners.
The sergeant could not positiYcly identify the tlefcndant as
the man he had seen in the car. At one time, Mrs. lVIiner saw
the man out of the car ·walking north to·ward a flower shop
on
corner of Fifty-ninth Place. Mrs. 1\Iiner identified
the (1efeudant as the man in the car. The Miners were both
familiar with the ceramics shop owned by the Forbeses and
knew both Despine and Hobert.
About 9:15 a. m., September 20, 1954, Mr. 1\Iiner saw the
same Pontiac, with the same man in it, going west on Fiftyninth Place. After making the boulevard stop on \Vest
Boulevard, the car turned south and passed from his sight;
within five minutes thereafter he saw the man who had bern
the Pontiac walking- around the apartment house
and then east on Fifty-ninth Place toward the alley. The man
turned his head and he and 1\fr. Miner stared at each other;
the man turned to his right at the alley and disappeared into
46 C.2d-18

,_

[46 C.2d
The man

ident ifie(l

Mr. ii!Jiller as the

About !J :1 a. Ill.,
ember
1\lrs. Simons was
UlJ elot lws in an arc·away lwh\.('nn the ceramics shop
and an
housl' wh('Jl she saw a
man enter
the areaway from .,West Boulevard awl go into the first entryin the buildi llg; she saw him lean out
and look toward her; when she started toward
him he ran out of the west entrance the way he had come.
Mrs. Simons identified defendant from a pic:tmc of him and
said that she recognized the lower part of his face sinl;C the
man she had seen in the areaway had hi.s hat pulled down
over his eyes. Sometime during the morning, she heard four
thumping, thudding sounds coming from within the ceramics
shop ; the sounds were different from those she had previously
heard coming from the shop.
Around 9 :45 a. m., September 20, 1954, Paul Y onadi left
his apartment at 3550 \Vest Fifty-ninth Place and backed
his car ont of the garage whic:h was across the areaway from
the rear of the ceramics shop into the alley. He got out of
the car to close the garage door. At this time, he saw a man,
whom he identified as the defendant, come out of the wooden
gate at the rear of the ceramics shop. Mr. Yonadi and the
man looked at each other; the man tllen walked southward
down the alley without turning around.
At 11:25 a.m., September 20, 1954, a sheriff's patrol officer
noted in his daily log that he had seen a 1932 Pontiac coach
with a Michigan license plate AA-69-30 standing without
a driver, or occupant, abont 250 yards from the beach area
at Point Dume, which is about 12 miles from Santa Monica.
The officer searched the car but found no registration or
identification. He looked for someone having a possible connection with the car but found no one. The driving time
between the ceramics shop and Point Dnme was approximately 49 minutes.
Between 11:15 and 11:30 a. m., September 20, 1954, a
salesman who made regular calls at the ceramics shop with
bread, found the front door of the shop open. He rang
several times but no one answered. He opened the door
leading from the display room to the room in back thereof
and saw the body of Mr. Forbes lying on the floor. The police
were called, and when they arrived to investigate they found
tllP body of Mrs. I<'orbes in a room adjoining that in which
Mr. Forbes' body was found. Both Mr. and Mrs. Forbes
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[46 C.2d 540; 297 P.2d 999]

close range
A

Forbes of the Los Angeles
was
·of the
Forbes.
:former husband
been from
and obDIClt1Xres of him from Despine 's mother. These
shown to the
and to Mrs. Simons
who all
as the man
seen that
latent fingerprint
were
identifiable; nor1e
the ceramics shop, 19 of
them corresponded to defendant's prints. A ''Cat's-Paw"
print was
by the rear gate to the
that the heel of
shoe
. The evidence
have made the
The evidence is
or types, of
used. Of ·the
recovered from the
shop, five
be slugs or spent bullets;
appeared to
po:ttions of bullets, one of
and
other two of a brass or copper material. The ballistics
was of the opinion that tire eight slugs and
in the
shop · well as the one recovered from
body of Despine had
been fired from a .45 caliber
and Wesson gun. :The expert witness was also of
opinion that the bullet recovered from the body of Robert
area around Point Dume
a .32 caliber bullet. The
the Pontiac car had been found parked on the morning·
September .20th was carefully searched and
rocks but failed to
oru,tntlr

man
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The defendant asked to be

; in it he found a
a
's Handbook" with certain underThe car was impounded
Pueblo; no
was ever made of the accident. The
record shows that it was possible for defendant to have been
Point Dume at the time noted and close to Pueblo on
22d.
Defendant >vas arrested in Hot Springs, Arkansas, on
1954. The officer sent to extradite him said
defendant said he had not been in r~os Angeles for some
seven or eight years. Defendant testified that he had arrived
in J_;os
on September 3, 1954; that he left after :five
or s1x
to go to Texas; that he arrived in Galveston,
or so before September 19th; that he saw his
father in Galveston; that on the 19th of September, he left
Galveston for Houston, which he left on the 20th; that he
arrived in Dallas on the 20th; that he left Dallas on the
20th after eating and getting gas for the Pontiac; that he
went to Oklahoma
leaving there on the 21st for Amarillo,
Texas, on his way to Colorado; that he left Amarillo between
midnight and 3 in the morning on the 22d, headed for Colorado on the way to Salt Lake City; tl1at l1e passed through
Pueblo and headed west; that he had a flat tire about 10 miles
outside Pueblo; that on the way back to Pueblo, he lost control
of the ear which overturned; that a farmer drove him into
Pueblo where by telephone he notified the police of the accident. He testified that from the bus depot in Pueblo, he
took a bus to Oklahoma City where he bougllt a ticket to
Hot Rprings, Arkansas, where he was arrested. Defendant
denied telling the officer he had not been in lJOS Angeles for
seven or
years ; and said that the guns* had been
tempornrily left by a customer and appeared to be .22 caliber
DEFENDANT

SANITY AT Tnm OF TRIAI..

Defendant contends that the court erred in proceeding to
! r·ial
on the first
of trial, February 7, 1955, there
·•·Heretofore mentionerl in ).fr. Pappos' teRtimony.

·while he is insane."
Section 1368 of the Penal Code
the pendency of an action and
to
a
arises as to the sanity of the
the court must
the question as to his sanity to be determined
a trial
the court without a jury, or with a
if a trial
is demanded. . . . ''
People argue that Dr. Miller's affidavit was handed
court "regarding the plea of not guilty by reason of
'; that such a plea ·was thereupon entered and three
appointed by the court to examine the defendant;
at no time did defendant's counsel suggest tl1at defendant
insane at the time of trial so as to bring into play the
of sections 1367 a ntl 1368 of the Penal Code. It is
by the People that defendant's counsel did not intiby affidavit or otherwise, that defendant was uncooperative or that they vYere unable to obtain assistance
or information from him in preparing his defense. Dr. Miller's affidavit shows, however, that "he [defendant] felt his
attorneys 'were railroading me in' and 'trying to get my
' "; that "He [defendant J has been
uncooperawith his attornrys and demanding; refusing to take
feeling that they should believe he is innocent, they
should get angry at the people he is angry
and that he
is supreme in hi.s knowledge."
reports of the three court-appointed doctors were received by the court approximately a week after the commenceof the trial. Two of these reports show that the doctors
of the opinion that defendant was sane at the time of
trial as well as at the time the crime was committed; the
third report was to the same effect, although stating that
defendant showed some "paranoid ideation.'

C.2d
P.2rl

178 CaL

Cal.
428 108 P.
v.
; People v. West, 25
467 [150 P.
) And it is
where, as a matter of law, a 'doubt' may
btc said o appear, or where there has been an abuse of tlw diseretion that is vested in the trial judge, in the determination
of the
that the conclusion of the latter properly
may be disturbed on appeal therefrom. (People v. GilbeTg,
197 Cal. 306, 317 [240 P. 1000]; People v. MoTiaTity, 61 Cal.
App. 223 [214 P. 485] ; People v. Rosner, 78 Cal.App. 497
[248 P. 683]; People v. J(iTby, 15 Cal.App. 264 [114 P. 794];
People v. Little, 68 Cal.App. 674 [230 P. 178]; People v.
Hettick, 126 Cal. 425 [58 P. 918].)" (People v. ApaTicio,
:18 Cal.2d 565 [241 P .2d 221].) It was also said in the Perry
case, supra, that if the person whose sanity is in question is
capable of understanding the nature and object of the pro.
t·eedings against him and can conduct his defense in a rational
manner, he should be deemed sane for the purpose of being
tried, though on some other subject his mind may be deranged
or unsound.
rrhe report of one of the court-appointed doctors shows
that defendant resent(•d the examinations; that he stated that
l1e resented the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity;
that he at all times e1aimed he was innocent of the crime
with which he was charged; that he refused to ansvYer numerous seemingly unrelated questions on the ground that his
refusal was on ''advice of counsel.''
Closely related to this problem is that which occurred after
the jury had returned a verdict of first degree murder with·
o11t recommendation :
'' rrnE CoURT : . . . I understand there is a matter to be
taken up out of the presence of the jury. IJet the reeord
show the district attorney, defense counsel and the defendant
are present. Is there anything yon gentlemen want to take
np before we proceed?
"MR. SoLOMON: I was going to make this statement, if
the Court please, that the defense is prepared to go ahead with
thiR plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. I understand,
though, Mr. Merkouris feels differently about it.
''THE DEFENDANT : Yes, that is right.
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say
rase:,

I

CoURT: Let me
think he did tllat
a matter of
would il
that plea >Yonld llave to be entered
brforc tl1e Court c:;tartrd its triaL T will say if I had becll
1 would haYe done' cxadly ihc saJJJC thing, and
law a few years myself. He's been
ng law a gl'eat many years. \\"e had also the advan~
of your other iwo aii orncys.
"
have 11011· got to the point where the next step in
the rial wou1rl be the trial of that question of 11ot gnilty
reason of immnity. Now, yon han· indieatcd tlmt yon don't
1nlllt that trial.
• Trm DlWK\'DAWr: T don't want what
CoUR1': You don't wa11t to])(' tried on tl1is qnr~tioJl
of
"Trm DEFENDAJ\i'l': Yes, ilHtl is cmTeet.
"'I'm.; CourtT: Do yon want to withdraw your plea of Hot
1

"'J'nE DEFENDA~T: Tlw plea was entered over my objection.
"'l'rn; Comvr: I nwlcrstand.
'"l'rm DEFENDANT: A~; I explained to those men, it carric~d
an implication of guilty, and that \Yas one of the main reasons
those people convicted me. \Vell, that's beside the point
How. T nnderstancl that; in any enmt I \Yant the plea <ritltflrawn right nmv. because as far as I Ntn sec it's nsele;.;s.
"'l'rm CoUR'r: I \Yant ron to thoroughl.v 111J(len:;1atH1 tlH·
ef'i'l'<·t of this sit nation. [ 'm not going to talk a bout your
1·<1~1\ 1 'm going to tall;: about cases iu which both pleas are
clllPred. If a defendant is trie(l for all offense and found
, and also has the plea of not gnilty b~- reason of inwe llext tr.\· in n•g11br order the qnestion as to that
ol' inS!illi1.\', i;.: 1lH· Ill!ltl leg·ally iiiN!ItH' or is hr leg·ally
lh:F~<:':Ill:\'1'-

I ltltdt•rstund tlwt.
II' tit1' .it:r)· fouttd hitn
Jly c-::llli', then
o11lPr wnli('(. of guill.\' stands: if' ftc· is legally im;aJJ('
operates as an acqniital. Now, that is an opportunity
Ill<

liE ( !onwr:

reason of ut~;a,11u.v
that still carries an
and I see no reason
I should give
I did not commit these
to go into the
convict me of crimes I did
I understand that.
I understand what you mean.
advised you to stand on your

"THE DEPENDANT: You're
at it from a lawyer's
but the jury is not.
"THE CouRT :
of course, we can't view it also from
the defendant's viewpoint, he's sitting in a different seat
at it.
'' 'I'HE DEI<'ENDANT: I want it withdrawn.
''THE CouRT : You definitely do not want to try this question of
''THE DEFENDANT: No.
''THE CouRT : You want to withdraw the plea
You understand if you do withdra\\· it, you stand convicted of first
degree murder with the death penalty~
'' 'fnE DEFEXDANT : I understand.
''THE CouRT : 'fhe only possibility you've g·ot is the chance
will be accomplished?
"TuE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.
''THE CouRT: I-1et the record show the plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity has been withdrawn."
It is contended by the defense that the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting defendant himself to
withdraw the plea of not guilty b~' reason of insanity when
he was represented by counsel and when the defendant's
sanity was the very issue involved.
Prior to the commencement of the trial itself, the court
had before it an affidavit of a qualified psychiatrist in which
it was averred, without any equiYoeation, that the defendant
was medically and legally insane at the time of trial, as well
as at the time the alleged act was committed. The Penal
Code
( § 1368) that "If at any time during the
of an action . . a doubt arises as to the sanity
of the defendant, the court must order the question as to his
sanity to be determined by a trial by the court without a
jury, or with a jury, if a trial by jury is demanded. . . . "

the
to examine the defendant It appears
that there was, at that
a doubt m
iw1 of the court as to tld'endaut
·12 CaL
21.) We ~aid in
568 [241 P.2d 221], that "wlwn a doubt of
'aL2d
defendant's
. appears on the face of the record
matter of law, an abuse of discretion is shown and the
to order a detrrmination of the
of sanity
in a misearriage of ;justice and a reversal is required.
v. Vester, 13.) Cal.App. 223 [26 P.2d
; People v.
snpra, 25 Cal.App. 869 [143 P. 793].)"
Taking the evidence concerning defendant's sanity
u:: r:•fleetrd in the record, we see that three court-appointed
consickred him sane at the time of trial as well
at the time the crime was eommitted; we see that one
psychiatrist (~onsidered him both legally and
im;ane at both times. This conflict in the mel1ical
was sufficient to make the question one of fact ·which
have been tried. 'l'he colloquy bl'tween the eourt and
the defendant relative to a withdrawal of the plea of not
by reason of in:':anity shows that the defemlant did
1mderstand the graYity of his predicament. (People v.
43 Cal.2d fi72. fi7G [275 P.2c1 2fi]; Prop7c v. Gomez,
(a1.2d 150, 158 [258 P.2d 825] ; People v. Ap(fririo, 38
565, 576 [241 P.2d 221].) He did not mmt, so he
, for the j nry to haw before it the "implication of guilt."
l t "honld be remembered that this d0sire of clcfE'rH1ant 's was
the jury had fomHl him g;nilty of 11mnler in
degree ·without recommendation.
It is our eonclnsion that the trial conrt abused its
in not trying the issue of defendant's sanity at
eommencement of the trial and in permitting tlw defendaHL over the implied objection of hiR counsel, to withdraw
hi,;
of not gnilty by reason of insanity. The People's
1ment that defense counsel did not offer Dr. ;\!filler's affi-

a doubt
, ilw ':ourt "nmsL order
It is the
ol' the eourt

if at any time
We said
P.2d 221], that
of the defendant . . . to
that he was
within the
of the section is not conupon the trial
the
statute is not conditioned on a motion in reliance on the
code provision." (People v. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18, 21; People
P.2d 685] ; People v.
135 Cal.App. 223, 237
198 Cal. 601, 606 [246 P. 802].) In People v. Vestm·,
1:35 Ca1.App. 223, 228 [26 P.2d 685], it was said: "If, then,
as a matter of law it appear that the facts were such that
a 'doubt' must or should have arisen (and not
simply that as a privilege, or as a favor, such a conclusion
mig·ht, or might not, have been accorded to defendant, dependent upon the discretion of the trial judge), it becomes
clear that in the failure by the trial judge to decide that a
'doubt' had arisen as to the sanity of defendant, and thereupon to order that 'the question as to his sanity . . . be submitted to a jury,' an omission by the trial court to exercise
what may be termed a jurisdictional duty resulted, with tlle
inevitable consequence that defendant was prejndicrd in his
substantial right in the premises.''
[5] Defendant was represented by counsel and "It is
settled that the attorney of record has the exclusive right to
appear in court for his client and to control the court proeeedings, so that neither the party himself (Anglo California Trust Co. v. Kelly, 95 Cal.App. 390 [272 P. 1080] ;
Boca etc. R. R. Co. v. S~Lperior Court, 150 Cal. 153 [88 P.
7151 ; Electric Utilities Co. v. Smallpage, 137 Cal.App. 642,
t343 [31 P.2d 412]; Toy v. Haskell, 128 Cal. 558 [61 P. 89, 79
Am.St.Rep. 70] CTescent Canal Co. v. Montgomery, 124
Cal. 134 [56 P. 797]; Wylie v. Sierra Gold Co., 120 Cal. 485
[52 P. 8091 ; JJiott v. Foster, 45 Cal. 72; Board of Commissioners v. Younger, 29 Cal. 147 [87 Am.Dcc. 164]), nor another attorney (,Johnston v. City of San Fernando, 35 CaL
App.2d 244, 247 [95 P.2d 147]; Drnmmon'd v. West, 212
Cal. 766, 769 [300 P. 823] ; McMahon v. Thomas, 114 Cal. 588
[46 P. 732] ; Prescott v. SaUhouse, 53 Cal. 221; Hobbs v. Duff,

[ 1:12 l'.2d
ll-ins! f'/'.
tlt0 fuf:i

INFOIDL\'l'TON

colltrnds that the tria 1 court f'Ollllni it f'd
misconduct iu prrmitti
the admission of e\·irelative to the deatl1 of Hobert Porhes when the distrit:i
had elected to
solely on tlw informatimt
him with the murder of Dnspi1w Porlws. It is
r-olltcnded that the admission of this cvide1wc \Yas so prejas to deprive him of due process of hnv \Yithin the
of both the federal and California Constitutions.
nppears that here the evidence com
of showell
nwr~' than merely criminal clisposition :mel was proprr1y <H1part of the res
or bec-nnse it helped to clisintent, or a eomnlOJJ plan or sdwnw. 'l'lw vif'iim:-:
deaths in the same 1mumer
from a11 that apat approximately the same time. The jnry was properl.1·
instruetccl eoneerning- the limite(1 Jllli']Hlse for whieh sueh
was reecived .
. \LLEOED Prn:.n·nr('I.\L J\Irsnl>:DUCT oF Tnl.\L CnPRT

It is eontended that tile trial euw·t wa~ g·uilty of
wli1·ial llliseondnd in informi11g· defPIHlant 1h;d il' lw
another ouih1n·st. he ·wou1(1 )H•
1he :ntlops,\· surgeou had tcslifi.Pd tOJH't'rlling· I!
of the body of Hobert Forlws. t)J<• following IJt', li0\1·, ,\IJII

lt~st

"

at

go 11heud

illl<l

illllslrai

wllili ~·on

ilied a bon I t•oJH·vr·n
Ilia! !irsi wound.
Couwr: iTo dt•f,;u;.;•.: vollllseli \:oi qtriiP
loud.
lvwt:JJ, 1 ean hear \\·hat ,\·on sa~· up het·1•.
Dr"TE:'\llA;'>;T: \\Tait 1 I mmlll like to make· a n•Juark
is tinH'.
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''THE CouRT:
''THE DEFENDANT : I'm
in my
about your
''THE CouRT : I don't care
''THE DEFENDANT : You are conducting this trial in a
You are
manner, in a
of two
here for one count. You are
who were killed.
this
''THE CoURT: I'm
'' 'rHE DEFENDANT : You are running this trial in a very
prejudicial manner.
"THE CouRT: You may proceed, Mr. Leavy.
''THE DEFENDANT: You stupid old fool!
"THE \VITNESS: Wound Number 1 - "MR. LEAVY: Doctor, I don't mean to interrupt you when
you point out this-'' THE DEFENDANT: You may have written a few books on
]aw, but you haven't learned anything. You not only have a
bungling police department-'' THE CouRT: That's enough. I want to inform counsel-''THE DEFENDANT: --but an unscrupulous prosecutor.
''THE CouRT: According to People versus Harris, I have a
right to order this man to be gagged so that he can't make any
noise, and I shall do so if >Ye have any further disturbance
along this line.''
In People v. Harris, 45 Cal.App. 547, 552-553 [188 P. 65],
a similar occurrence took place and the court threatened in the
presence of the jury to gag the defendant. It was there
said: "It was the right of the defendant to be present at his
trial and this right, notwithstanding his obstreperous conduct, was accorded him. It is the duty of a judge in the administration of justice to preserve the order of the court
and to see to it that all persons whomsoever, including the defendant himself, indulge in no act or conduct calculated to
obstruct the administration of justice." In People v. Loomis,
27 Cal.App.2d 236, 239 [80 P.2d 1012], the defendant, because of his loud and tumultuous conduct during the trial,
was strapped to a chair and gagged. It was there held that
''There can be no doubt as to the right o£ the court to use
reasonable restraint in order to conduct the trial in an orderly
and dignified manner." In view of the defendant's conduct,
no prejudicial misconduct on the part of the trial court appears.

v
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court erred in <tutlut,tutg;
written
defendant to
two
rec,cuu;u that
letters themselves had
and that he was peJrmi[tteid
nn,~nh~~';~~ his recollection of their contents.
It
also be recalled
the letter to Robert
worry about his wife's <Ui'"l>'."'u
he would not be around long.
ren.ua1:u that the
if any, was <tj4<uu;st
Ue!mnle with whose murder he is
In this connecit is also
that the evidence concerning the letters
remote as to be immaterial and
[8] In anto the first argument, in People v. WiU, 173 Cal. 477,
[160 P. 561], it was said (quoting from Peop,le v.
67 Cal.
[7 P. 643]): "'While
against
deceased are admissible in evidence to show malice, threats
another person are only admitted under cireumsta,nc,es wkiek skow' some connection witk tke injury inflicted
are
Where a sufficient
the deceased.' (The
connection is shown such threats are clearly admissible.''
The evidence here showed that both persons had been
in the same manner and, presumably, at approximately
same time. The letter to Despine which accused her of
a sexual degenerate could certainly be considered a
malicious letter and the one to Robert a threat because of his
to Despine. (People v. Hong Ak Duek, 61 Cal.
390; People v. (Jlur;ves, 122 Cal 134, 143 [54 P. 596];
v. De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 474 [50 P.2d 1031].)
The court did not err in admitting secondary evidence of the contents of the letters inasmuch as proof of the
destruction thereof was
made by Inspector Wood who
testified as to the contents of the letters. Section 1855
Code of Civil Procedure provides that ''There can be
evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing
except in the following cases:
'' 1. When the original has been lost or destroyed; in
which ease proof of the loss or destruction must first be
. . . '' The same section also provides that when a
has been lost or destroyed, either a copy thereof or
as to the contents may be admitted. (People v.
<r'"'"''m 110 Cal.App.2d 456, 462, 463 [243 P.2d 59]; Deaoon,
Bryans, 88 Cal.App. 322,324 [263 P. 371],)

fl74 i lH P.
eontended that the trial eourt erred in
in evidence
of (,ertain
'fhe poliee offieer who
to Arkansas after defendant
while
certain
his first eonversation with defendant. ·when
he made a copy thereof
of machine. At the
defense counsel
to the use of the copy wl1ich was played because its sound facilities were better. In addition, the original
also
Evidence vvas admitted to show the eopy was a true and
correct one and defendant was advised by the trial court
prior to the playing of the copy of the recording that it
,,·as secondary evidence. [12] Both the original recording
ani!. the eopy thereof were admitted in evidence without
objection, and the original, as well as the copy, was played
to the jury. Under the circumstances here present, defendant
eannot now complain that a copy of the original recording
was played to the jury. (People v. Porter, 105 Cal.App.2d
324, 331 f233 P.2cl 102]; People v. Wignall, 12G Cal.App.
465, 474 !13 P.2d 995]; People v. Sellas, 114 Cal.App. 367,
378 [300 P. 150] .)
[13] Defendant also complains that certain notes and a
\Vl'itten transcription of the tape reconling used by the
officer were erroneously admitted in evidence over objection. 'l'he reeord shows that the notes were used pursnant to
section 2047 of the Code of Civil Procednre. * 'I' he record
shows that the questioned writings were marked for identification; that the court informed all attorneys they might see and
nse them, to whieh defense counsel replied, '' 'l'hank yon
Ycry much.''
7G CaL

'A witness is allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by
:mything written by himself, or under his direc-tion, at the time when the
f:tct occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at nny other time when
the fact was fresh in his memory, and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing. But in such case the writing must be
produced, and may be seen by the adverse party, who may, if he choose,
cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it to the jury. So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, but such evidence must be received with
<'aution.''
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Byrd. 42 Ca1.2cl 200. 20!1
P 2d :lOG i:
\' TnthW. :n Cal.2d ~~2. 101 [lin P.2rl lfij) \Ye
hen• the eknwnis of
an;l wa1ehi11g, but the
is dcYoill of any cddcnee trnr1ing 1o show that il1e
dP!'<·JHlant mn(le :111,\'
to ro11rcal himself or to
JH'Psence in the •deinily of the slwp a srrrct. Jn tfl~"
ease. it waR held !hat "1·on,·ealnwnt in mnbush" W<IS 11oi
1',\' 111111 thnt i he C!Yiclenee tlwrc fnlly
fied the
s
fi1Hling "tltat the homiciile wns tlw result of drfendant's inl•" to kill anc1 was ~H:romplished h)' his '
in \Ynit' nniil
npportnne time to strike. .
''
Cal.2d 48:i, 492. 493.
Tuthill ra::;P, it 11·a~ held 1ha1' tll(•
we~~
'·
"'mrans' iln·ougl1 which defrudmJt
his
I'. HISC." (31 Cal.2d D2, ]01.) Tn il1e
r!l enrw. tlH~ i'VI·
~'<' slwwe1l tlwt rlrJencla11t ·waited outside his ,,·ife 's lHmsr•
Yrith n g·un nnr1 ihat thr mui'rler oernrred that nig·ht
C'a1.2,1 200. 2mn. fn illrs(~ tbrer~ Nt;;e~ tlw killing·s orafter ilii~ ''
in wnit." and l.1in:.r in •.Yait
tll<' "i'l<'illl~" tl!roll.':·li w!Ji,]J <·:wli d<'f<·nd:!lli :l<'•'<>lllJili:-;h(•rl
j ,;
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at that time. The facts in the case under consideration do
not appear to us to
a
in wait instruction. The
killings were not accomplished through defendant's watchful
waiting in his car; there was no attempt at either concealment
or secrecy ; and the killings did not follow on the heels of the
watchful
not sufficient to
can be no doubt
ili~

~~

if the killing was committed by lying in
it was murder
of the first
by force of the statute
Code, § 189)
and the question of premeditation was not further involved
(People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 200, 209 [266 P.2d 505]; People
v. Tutlvill, 31 Cal.2d 92, 99 [187 P.2d 16]).
Two REASONABLE THEORIES INSTRUCTION

[15] It is next contended that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury concerning its duty if the evidence was susceptible of two reasonable theories.
Defendant offered this instruction: ''If the evidence in
this case is susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one
of which points to the guilt of the defendant, and the other
to his innocence, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt that
interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence,
and reject that which points to his guilt.
"You will notice that this rule applies only when both
of the two possible opposing conclusions appear to you to be
reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other
to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the
reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing
in mind, however, that even if the reasonable deduction points
to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must carry the convincing force required by law to support a verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.''
The court instructed the jury as follows: ''A defendant
in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place
upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It
is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to

of lwo eonsiri!l'i ions or
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which appears to you to be
to the guilt of the defendant, and the other
uu<vc.c;ucoc, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt that
which will admit of the defendant's innocence,
that which
to his guilt.' This
proper as far as it goes. To it shmtlcl have been
statement
the
1tneler disadded.) It will be notN1 that in tlw
f·ase
the "precise principle" 1vas
tu
instrnction which was given in tlw
Bender
was here omitted. In the Bender case, we held
that under the facts there presented, the failure to instrnet
was not ground for reversal.
The evidence here is entirely circumstantial. No mnrdcr
\n·apon
1n~apons) were ever found; no fingerprints matc11those of defendant were found in the ceramics shop.
The most incriminating evidence against defendant is that he
was identified as the man coming out of the back gate of the
ceramics shop. Defendant's theory was that he was not
g·uilty; tha.t he was not in Los Angeles on the 20th, although
h admitted having bren there on the Bd through the 8th
or 9th of September when he left for Texas. From the
resumi\ of the evidence heretofore set forth, it appears that
at the time the case was submitted to the jury reasonable
inferences of either guilt or innocence could have been drawn
therefrom. The jury could have disbelieved the idcntifieation testimony of Mr. Yonadi who said it was the defendant
he Raw coming out of the back gate; it could have disbelieved
the testimony of Mrs. Simons who said that the defendant
1vas the man she bad seen in the areaway because she recognized "the lower part of his face" from a colored picture.
l'n<lcr the eircnmstances here presented, that part of Clufcndant 's instruction bearing upon two reasonable intcrpreta1ions. or constructions, of the evidence should have been given.
Defendant's offered instruction was refused bceanse the
trial court felt that it was not good law in that it "virtually
says that 1vhen ilw PYideJH'0 is eqnall.\· hahmec•11 tlw defendant is eni i!led to a Yerdid of ac(]uitta1" and because it
~was in t·onflid. wiilt t1t<' t·easomthlP <lonht inst rn..tion. [16] In
;l •·rilllinul ('ase llw pl·use<·Jtl ion HlWd pro\'<' i lit• ,],.f,•tHla!l1
lty
a r<'f!Sonable <lo1tbi. 'l'h<·t·<'fOl'<\ if flt(' t•Yill<'tH·P
ts <·q
hahtll<'<'d. the d('f<·n<lani iN Ptliitlt•tl to an a('<ptittal.
Pnrillt•J>, tlwn· is in thn propos<'d instrnetion nothing int'Oilsisteut \Yith the instnwtion on reasonable doubt. The offered
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,J., and

\'0111'11

disse11t.
y opinion bases 1he reverRal npon I

the trial court eommittcd prejwlidal
respects: (
In
to try the
of dcfendani 's sanity at the commencement of the trial
defendant to withdraw his
of not
reason of insanity following the trial on the
of
( 3) In
an instmction on the subject of
in
; and
In failing to give a certain """'"n,o<~t
s1 ruetion relating to circumstantial evidence. In my
a review of the record, including the evidence, shows that
def'<'!Htant was accorded a fair trial, free from any prejudicial
; that defendant was properly convicted of a deliberai <~
premeditated murder perpetrated by means of lying in
and that no ground for reversal has been shown ao:;
thrre has been no "miscarriage of justice." ( Const., art.
§ 4J;2.)
may be conceded at the outset that defenrlan t was an
mmsnal type of person, whose history and actiom; may bP
Sii
to ha\·e evidenced some deYiation from the normal. 'fhp
may he said, however, cotH:('rning a large perceutage
of JH'f'sons vvl10 commit sPrions crimes; but this does not in(liente that snch persons have not the reqn isite eapacit,v i o
to trial and conviction for the offenses \vhich
It is only certain types of iucapaeitics, within the
broad meaning of the word "insane," which deprive a person of snfficient capaeity to stand trial upon criminal eharges
v. Pen·y, 14 Cal.2d 387, 399 [94 P.2d f5G9, 124 A.hR
; People v. Kirby, 15 Cal.App. 264, 2G8 fll4 P. 7941)
or which deprive him of sufficient eapaeit,v to be held (~rimresponsiblc for his acts. (People v. J(imball. ;) Cal.2d
GOF'. GlO [55 P.2d 483] .) It is for this reaROJl that mere
evidenee that a person is "insanc" or of "unsound
" which often means no more than that there is sonH'
dPYiation from the normal in some respect, has been held in
eases to be insufficient to show lack of capaeity of the
individual for a particular purpose. (Estate of Lingen-

said at page 568 [241 P.2d
:"Even
as to insanity in a general sense
to create a doubt insofar as that testimony
to the defendant's ability to conduct his
Darling, 107 Cal.App.2d 635 [237
v. Huntoon, 41 Cal.App. 392 [182
case, a reading of the record, including
and his other statements made during
trial, leaves no doubt that defendant apand rational person, although
v""'""~'eu of the best judgment. In addition, the
considerrrl
of the three court-appointrrl experts who
examined him
the course of the trial showed that
defendant was sane both at the time he committed the offense
and at the time of trial. Defendant obviously was keenly
aware of the nature of the charge and of the proceedings,
and had
definite ideas concerning the manner in which
he wanted the case tried. It appears that from the outset he
of entering a plea of not guilty by
He was represented by able counsel, who
no doubt realized that the evidence would clearly indicate
that defendant had killed the victims, and that it might be
advisable under the circumstances to interpose the additional
of not
by reason of insanity. In this connection,
counsel obtained the affidavit of Dr. Thfiller and presented
it to the
but without any suggestion that anyone was
of the
that defendant then lacked the capacity to
stand trial upon the charge against him. On the contrary,
the affidavit was presented by counsel solely ''regarding the
plea of not
by reason of insanity." The court thereupon accepted that plea and appointed, as was its duty, three
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that defendant was sane at all
imes. All of these facts clearly indicated that defendant
would be found sane upon any trial of the issue. Counsel
therefore
stated: ''I was going to make this statement,
the Court please, that the defense is prepared to go ahead
with this
of not guilty by reason of insanity. I under~
Mr. ~Ierkouris feels differently about it."
followed an extended discussion between court and de\Vhich included defendant's repeated insistence that
did not want a trial on the insanity issue and
with the court's statement: "I1et the record show the
of not guilty
reason of insanity has been withdrawn."
Coum;cl did not enter into this discussion or advance any
thereto or to the final declaration of the court conwithdrawal of the plea. The record therefore in<licates final acquiescence by counsel in, rather than any
"implied objection" to, defendant's withdrawal of the plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity. The situation is quite
similar to that presented in People v. Perry, sttpra, 14 Cal.
2d 387, where "defendant, in person," withdrew the plea
his eonnsel had prPviously stated, "I am willing
ro proceed with this insanity plea." (P. 396.) I am therefore of the opinion that there was neither error nor an abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in permitting the
withdrawal of the plea, and manifestly there was no prejudice.
\Vith
to the instructions, the majority opinion
concludes tl1at the trial court committed prejudicial error
in g1vmg any instruction on the subject of lying in wait,
as "the evidence is not sufficient to justify the lying in wait
instruction." I cannot join in this conclusion, as I do not
bclieye it can br reconciled with the decisions of this court in
People v. Byrd. 42 Cal.2d 200 [266 P.2cl 5051 ; People v.
41 Cal.2d 483 [261 P.2d 241]; and People v. 'fniMll,
::n Cal.2d 92 [187 P.2d 16].
Prom the evidence set forth in the majority opinion, tJ1e
jury could properly infer that defendant had long entertained the deliberate and premeditated intention of killing
his victims; that he had obtained guns for that particnlar
purpose; ! hat he ha<l i raveled from Detroit to TJos Angde!l
in a Pontiac antomobile and registered under an assumed
name to conceal his identity; that he had waited in, and
watched from, his automobile in the vicinity of his victims'
place of business for long hours during many
pre-

i

his intended
and no other person was
in their
accomplished his purpose
by means of such lying in wait.
opinion states: "We have here the elements
and watching, but the record is
of any
""uuu.,~ to show that the
made any
"'"'"'"''u himself or to
his presence in the
a secret. '' In roy opinion, there was
to show that all the necessary elements of
in wait
The "concealment" which is mentioned in conwith lying in wait has never been held to mean comconcealment from everyone. Such complete concealis ordinarily impossible. All that is required, or should
be
is evidence showing an attempt on the part of
the murderer to conceal his presence from his intended vicwhile watching and waiting for the opportune time to
out his purpose. Thus, evidence of watching and waitin an automobile on a public street or road for the nn"f>n.r.'"'
perpetrating murder has been held sufficient to
the
of an instruction on lying in wait (People v. Byt·d,
Cal.2d 200; People v. Butic, 41 Cal.2d 483 [261
) , and it is immaterial in any case that the intended
victim may have become actually aware of the presence of
murderer either immediately before or some time before
the killing occurred. (People v. Butic, sttpra; People v.
supra, 31 Cal.2d 92.) It appears sufficient if the
"'"''""'"~and waiting are accompanied by any attempted concealment from the victim as "part of defendant's plan to take
victim later by surprise.'' (People v. Butic, sup1·a, 41 Cal.
2d
492.)
court has not heretofore adopted the view ""''"'""''"'""'rl
dissenting opinion in People v. Byrd, supra, 42
217-218, that despite the existence of ample evidence
to show watching, waiting and attempted concealment from
intended victim until the opportune time to n,·,.nt>tv·<>t<>
the
an instruction on lying in wait is
it appears that the victim became "aware of defendant's
' prior to the murder and "there is no evidence that
the shots were fired from a position of concealment."
I do not believe that such view should be

an inthe

however : ''In the present
the morning of the 20th; the
in his car in the
seen
on the 18th; he was not seen watching or waiting
HW'L"''us of the 20th, although he was seen driving his
car in
at that time. The facts in the case
consideration do not appear to us to justify a lying
in wait instruction.'' I cannot follow this reasoning. There
was evidence that defendant had been watching and waiting
in his
car near the scene of the murder on the mornand afternoons of at least eleven separate days in September
to September 20, the last day being September
There was also evidence that defendant was driving his
car and later walking in the vicinity on the morning of the
murder on
20. The jury could properly infer
that
all such
including the day of the murder, defendant was attempting to conceal himself from his intended
victims in order to take them by surprise, and was watching
and
for the opportune moment to perpetrate the
murder. I find no authority to indicate that one who watches
and waits for the opportune moment to commit murder while
in an automobile or on foot in the vicinity of a parmay not be held to be ''lying in wait'' within
of section 189 of the Penal Code, and no good
I am therefore of the opinion
reason appears for so
that there was abundant evidence to justify the giving of
the instruction on lying in wait; and that the conclusion of
that the evidence was insufficient for that purthe
finds no support in the authorities cited in
but is directly contrary to said authorities.
The reversal by the majority is further predicated upon

circumstantial
trial court did in the instructions
I ·would affirm tlw
new trial.

and the

concurred.
rd1earing was denied June 20,
Spence,
were of the

